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probability of taxpayer success under this test is inversely proportionate to
the amount of perceived abuse existing in the transaction. Because the nature
of partnership activities is diverse, and therefore the determination of abuse
so varied, the outcome of the "substantially all" test will probably depend
upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case presented to the court.
Another unresolved issue arises in the event the court finds that less than
substantially all of the assets would qualify for section 1031 treatment. The
consistent position of the court appears to be that, instead of recognizing
gain on the nonqualifying assets individually, the entire transaction would
be precluded from nonrecognition treatment. This position follows the court's
entity approach, avoiding the numerous administrative problems that would
ensue if an alternative approach were adopted.
Long is illustrative of the court's convictions in this area. That case reaffirmed the court's "substance over form" test and illustrated that the manipulation of partnership liabilities in order to avoid gain recognition under section
1031(d) will not be tolerated. In computing the amount of gain recognized
under section 1031, the court will again use the entity approach and determine the amount of net liabilities relieved at the partnership level. Although
there are numerous unaddressed technical questions at both tiers of the court's
analysis, the court has steadfastly used this approach. Accordingly, it is indicative of the court's future resolutions of problem areas in the exchange
of partnership- interests.
Richard D. Craig

Taxation: Start-up Cost Treatment Under § 195: Tax
Disparity in Disguise
Incentives for investment in new business have traditionally been derived
from sources other than the tax law. In no area is disincentive more clearly
evident than in the tax treatment of investigatory expenses and start-up costs.
The "trade or business" requirement of section 162' is the device used to
deny tax parity between a new or prospective venture and an established
business.2 Neither investigatory expenses 3 nor start-up costs" can be currently
parent reason for treating each type of property differently. Cf. A.L.I. FEDER. INco.ME TAX
PROJECT, supra note 62. (The effect of the existence of these two types of property is treated
differently.)
I. I.R.C. § 162.

2. See Richmond Televison Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.) vacated on other
grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965); Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521 (1979),
aff'd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980).
3. Ewart v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (P-H) 105 (1966); Valet v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.
461 (1958); Polachek v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 858 (1954); Frank v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.
511 (1953).
4. Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 19"0); Richmond
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deducted as business expenses because they are generally incurred when the
taxpayer is not yet "carrying on any trade or business." ' Assuming the business
is entered into, the taxpayer is forced to capitalize the expenditures, the amount
recoverable over the life of the business (or asset) depending on whether the
resulting asset 6 has an ascertainable useful life. 7 If, however, the expense is
related solely to the establishment of a business in general, the expense is
in the nature of goodwill and not recoverable until the business is disposed of.
Although section 1958 intends to remedy this effect by allowing 5-year amortization of all investigatory and start-up costs incurred by a new trade or
business, it is unlikely to "decrease controversy and litigation arising under
present law with respect to the proper income tax classification of start-up
expenditures." ' 9 No def'iite guidelines are provided for determining which taxpayers are subject to its provisions. Presumably, once a taxpayer has reached
the threshold for an "acquired trade or business,"' 1 which is deemed equivalent
to the month the "business begins,""II all subsequent recurring start-up costs
would be currently deductible under section 162(a).I 2 Congress has suggested 3
the applicability of Code sections 248" and 709 to supply the definition of

Televison Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S.
68 (1965); Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424 (1980); Francis v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M.
(P-H) 706 (1977).
5. I.R.C. § 162(a).
6. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974) stands for the proposition that
the depreciable period of a capital expenditure is determined by the life of the asset so created
or enhanced by the expenditure.
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 provides that an intangible asset may be the subject of a depreciation allowance if its useful life can be estimated with reasonable accuracy. An investigatory expense or start-up cost that is attributed to the creation of a license, patent, or franchise, for
example, may be amortizable. Expenses classified as organizational expenditures are allowed to
be amortized over 60 months, beginning in the month in which the corporation or partnership
begins business. I.R.C. §§ 248, 709.
8. I.R.C. § 195.
9. S. REP. No. 1036, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7293, 7301 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1036].
10. I.R.C. § 195(d).
11. I.R.C. § 195(a).
12. I.R.C. § 162(a) provides that a deduction shall be allowed for all ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.
13. S. REP. No. 1036, supra note 9.
14. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1(a)(3), which explains the definition of when a business
begins for purposes of amortizing organizational expenditures:
The determination of the date the corporation begins business presents a question
of fact which must be determined in each case in light of all the. circumstances
of the particular case. The words "begins business," however, do not have the
same meaning as "in existence." Ordinarily, a corporation begins business when
it starts the business operations for which it was organized; a corporation comes
into existence on the date of its incorporation. Mere organizational activities, such
as the obtaining of the corporate charter, are not alone sufficient to show the beginning of business. If the activities of the corporation have advanced to the extent
necessary to establish the nature of its business operations, however, it will be deemed
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when a business begins; however, taxpayers are unlikely to remain dormant
when the threshold essentially remains a factual determination. In fact, the
determination of when a business begins for one Code provision need not
be applicable to another because the underlying rationale may be different.1 5
of a capital nature, whereas
Organizational expenditures' 6 are undoubtedly
7
start-up costs may be inherently recurring.'
If the taxpayer is within the scope of a prospective business under section
195, amortization of start-up expenditures will only be allowed if the expenditure would be currently deductible if paid or incurred in the expansion of
an existing trade or business in the same field as that entered into by the
taxpayer.'" However, decisions on the current deductibility of start-up costs
by an expanding business are presently in disarray. Courts have reached different results depending on whether the "separate and distinct additional
20
asset" 19 test or the "one-year rule" is applied.
This note will examine the interplay of these unsettled matters within the
terms of section 195. The issue of when a business begins applies in particular
to the tax treatment of recurring start-up costs. Section 195 presupposes that
such costs are nondeductible and purports to provide relief from capitalization. Taxpayers should not be so easily dissuaded from challenging the con-

cepts upon which section 195 is founded. The applicability of the separate

and distinct additional asset test to costs incurred by the expanding business
is more relevant to the question of whether certain investigatory and nonrecurring start-up costs can be amortized by the new trade or business. Recurring
start-up costs would, of course, be currently deductible by the expanding

business, and amortizable by the new business if so elected.
to have begun business. For example, the acquisition of operating assets which
are necessary to the type of business contemplated may constitute the beginning
of business.
15. See generally Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 503-04 (1974) ("carrying on" requirement of § 162 is not necessarily equivalent with "in connection with his trade or business"
in § 174); Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941) (the definition of business for
purposes of determining whether managing securities constitutes carrying on a business is not
determined by the definition of business for purposes of an Excise Tax Act); Roth, Trade or
Business Requirement of Sec. 162 and the Deductibility of PreoccupancyExpenses Incurred in
Rental Real Estate Projects, 57 TAXEs 33 (1979) (Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1(a)(3) is more applicable
to the trade or business requirement in § 162 than is Treas. Reg. § 1.372-4(b)(5), which provides
that a corporation commences the active conduct of its business when it first engages in activities
designed or intended to enable it to engage in any business operation. But see infra text accompanying notes 16, 17).
16. See Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1(b). Organizational expenditures are defined as those that are
directly incident to the creation of the corporation. It is well settled that expenses intimately
connected with the acquisition of an asset are capital expenditures. See also 4A J. MERTENS,
JR., FEDERAL INcoiEm TAXATION § 25.25 (rev. ed. 1979).
17. See Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
18. I.R.C. § 195(b)(2).
19. NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (where expenditures do not
create or enhance a separate and identifiable asset, they are considered "ordinary and necessary").
20. Id. (expenditures providing benefits beyond one year must be capitalized).
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Trade or Business Requirement: Investigation Expenses
By definition, the "trade or business" requirement is not at issue in the
tax treatment of investigation expenses for the prospective venturer. "Investigatory expenses are costs of seeking and reviewing prospective business
prior to reaching a decision to acquire or enter any business."', The "trade
or business" requirement refers to an existing business, a condition not met
when the taxpayer is merely investigating the possibility of a formal commitment to enter a business.22 As stated in Richmond Television Corp. v. United
States, "expenses prior to and for the purpose of reaching a decision whether
to establish a business are undisputably capital expenditures.""
On the other hand, the existing business contemplating a new investment
24
is more likely to achieve current deductibility. In York v. Commissioner,
the taxpayer in the residential and commercial real estate business incurred
the cost of an expert survey to determine the potential prospects of nearby
land for industrial development. The amount was held deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense, incurred for land "within the compass of his field" 25 and not for an entirely new business.
Commentators have criticized the "existing business" rule contending that
deductibility of an investigation expense should not be determined according
to when it is incurred, but whether it relates to personal as opposed to business
activity.2 6 In other words, all expenses incurred by a taxpayer are either
nondeductible personal expenses under section 262 or profit-motivated business
expenses under section 162. If the expenses are concededly for a business purpose, only the "ordinary and necessary" limitation of section 162 should mandate capitalization. Once an individual or corporation has focused on a particular business with a bona fide investigative intent, all subsequent investigatory costs should be currently deductible. The majority of the cases,
though, deny section 162 treatment at the investigative stage. Accordingly,

21. S. REP. No. 1036, supra note 9. According to the Senate Finance Committee Report,
"investigatory expenses" include expenses incurred for the analysis or survey of potential markets,
products, labor supply, and transportation facilities.
22. Ewart v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (P-H) 105, 107 (1966); Koons v. Commissioner, 35
T.C. 1092, 1101 (1961).
23. 345 F.2d 901, 905 (4th Cir. 1965).
24. 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958).
25. Id. at 422. See also Malmstedt v. Commissioner, 578 F.2d 520 (4th Cir. 1978) (residential
developer undertaking commercial development is within the general scope of real estate); Vanderbilt
v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (P-H) 916 (1957) (writer and lecturer attempting to obtain employment as a television narrator was found to be carrying on a trade or business). But see Mid
State Products Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 696 (1954) (taxpayer engaged in business of buying
and selling frozen eggs was denied deduction for expenses of investigating the feasibility of entering business of buying and selling dried eggs; the court stated the expenses were similar to organization costs, the corporate franchise, goodwill, and other nonwasting assets).
26. E.g., Fleischer, The Tax Treatment of Expenses Incurredin Investigationfor a Business
or Capital Investment, 14 TAx L. REv. 567 (1959); Wilberding, An Individual's Business Investigation Expenses: An Argument Supporting Deductibility, 26 TAx LAWYER 219 (1972).
27. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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section 195 does not attempt to move backward the point at which a business
begins, whenever that might be; rather, it grants amortization as a compromise.
The legislative history of section 195 suggests a section 16528 loss may be
allowable for lost expenses incurred in an unsuccessful attempt to acquire
a specific business.2 9
Trade or Business Requirement: Start-up Costs
Under section 195, start-up costs are categorized with investigation expenses
and are apparently intended to receive similar amortization treatment. Startup costs are defined as those costs incurred subsequent to a decision to establish
a particular business but prior to its actual operation." Some courts have
felt there is no logical reason to deny current deductibility to start-up costs
if they are of a noncapital nature." Investigatory expenses are generally of
a nonrecurring nature, i.e., it is no longer necessary to explore the viability
of a particular business once the decision for entry has been made. Further,
there is the possibility for taxpayer abuse because bona fide investigation efforts would ordinarily be determined by the taxpayer's testimony.32 To the
contrary, recurring start-up costs are easily identified, often identical to those
incurred by an operating business, ranging from advertising, employee training, and consultant fees to utility bills and janitorial services. Blitzer v. United
States3 suggests that the section 195 election to amortize recurring start-up
costs is, perhaps, an alternative to current deductibility and not simply relief
from capitalization.
In Blitzer a partnership was formed for the purpose of constructing and
operating an apartment complex. Upon making a firm commitment to going
forward with the project as a result of financing arrangements, the partnership paid an administrative management fee to the general partner. The general
partner's services included both the acquisition of capital assets, such as the
organization of the partnership and the approval of the loan, and the performance of recurring administrative services, such as record-keeping. The
United States argued that, regardless of the related services or costs, no portion of the fee was deductible because the projects would not be ready for
occupancy or producing revenue until the subsequent taxable year, and thus

28. I.R.C. § 165.
29. S. REP. No. 1036, supra note 9.
30. Id. According to the Senate Finance Committee Report, "start-up" costs include advertising, salaries and wages paid to employees who are being trained and their instructors, travel
and other expenses incurred in lining up prospective distributors, suppliers, or customers, and
salaries or fees paid or incurred for executives, consultants, and for similar professional services.
31. E.g., 379 Madison Ave., Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1932); Blitzer v.
United States, 684 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Duffy v. United States, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9467 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Whitman v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 845 (W.D. La. 1965).
32. See, e.g., Stroope v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. 1487 (1975) (taxpayer took trip to Hawaii
shortly before Christmas and testified his principal purpose was to investigate real estate
opportunities).
33. 684 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
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the taxpayer could not have been "carrying on a trade or business" pursuant
to section 162. In response, the court stated the function of "trade or business"
in section 162 is not to require a "precise matching of income and expenses
in the same year," but rather to distinguish between business and personal
expenses. The court stated:
Construed in this light, it is clear that the "trade or business" requirement in I.R.C. § 162(a) is no barrier to any deductions for
1973 [operations did not begin until 19741. For, at all times during
that year the partnership was engaged in endeavors serving
"business" or profit-making purposes rather than personal ones.
Thus the partners would qualify for deduction of non-capital expenditures for the production of income pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 162(a). ....
The Blitzer court did not believe that the "trade or business" phrase has
acquired a tangential restriction, which, in effect, would classify common
business expenses as nonbusiness expenses simply because the enterprise is
not yet producing revenue. Rather, it should be construed in its traditional
sense." The nondeductibility of personal or family expenses not only limits
the expenses of an individual under section 212,36 but it similarly restricts
the availability of a deduction under section 162. A taxpayer, even though
in corporate form, must possess a dominant income or profit motive in order
to be carrying on a trade or business when the expense is incurred." This
determination requires an all-facts-and-circumstances analysis."
Several cases illustrate the emphasis placed on the business nature of the
9
the taxexpense, rather than on its timing. In Markovitz v. Commissioner"
payer, a promoter and developer of new business, devoted all his time to such
business activity in 1946, although he did not receive income until 1947. The
taxpayer contended that his efforts were the "groundwork" for income subsequently received. The court held that "[t]he rule to be applied here is set

34. Id. at 879-80.
35. The Blitzer court cited United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 45-46 (1963) for the following
proposition:
A basic restriction upon the availability of a § 23(a)(1) deduction [predecessor to
§ 162] is that the expense item involved must be one that has a business origin.
That restriction not only inheres in the language of § 23(a)(1) itself, confining such
deductions to "expenses . . .incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or business,"
but also follows from § 24(a)(1) [predecessor to § 262], expressly rendering nondeductible "in any case . . . [p]ersonal, living, or family expenses."
684 F.2d at 879.
36. I.R.C. § 212.
37. International Trading Co. v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 1960) ("A corporation is normally deemed to be engaged in a 'trade or business'; however, to the extent that
it is operated solely for the pleasure of its stockholders, it is not engaged in a 'trade or business'. ").
38. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
39. 21 T.C.M. (P-H) 723 (1952).
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forth in Dogget v. Burnet, "° since the evidence shows that the motive underlying
all of petitioner's activities was the profit motive, even though he did not
get profits in 1946.""
In Bailey v. Commissioner'2 the taxpayer was a retired inventor who remained personally active in his efforts to obtain several patents for his inventions. In holding that the expenses incurred were currently deductible, the
court noted:
True, he had not yet received any income from the inventions conceived by him during this period, but we are convinced that he
reasonably expected to realize profit from these activities. .

.

. If

he were so devoting his energies it does not matter that his efforts
had not yet begun to pay off.

. ..

The court further stated the line of cases holding that investigatory expenses
are not deductible was not applicable to the treatment of start-up costs."
Richmond Television Corp. v. United States,45 and its progeny," represent
a strict and definitive approach to determining what constitutes "carrying on
a trade or business," a position the IRS has adopted nationally on audit.4 7
Essentially, subsequent decisions have interpreted Richmond Television to require the simultaneous generation of operational revenues before the current
deductibility of "ordinary and necessary" start-up costs. However, the unique
fact situation in Richmond Television militates against a broad application
of its reasoning to all beginning business.
In Richmond Television, the dispute involved the treatment of employee
training expenses incurred after the incorporation of a television station but
prior to the taxable year in which the FCC broadcasting license was received
and actual broadcasting was begun. Recognizing that case law had not
previously established when a business begins for purposes of section 162
deductions, the court stated the determination is usually a factual issue. Nevertheless, the court held, "as a matter of law," that the taxpayer was not in
business until the license was obtained and broadcasting began."' The lack
of operating revenue, however, was not explicitly held to be a sufficient factor in itself to justify denial of section 162 deductions. The court did not
hold the taxpayer was not in business because neither the license was obtained
40. 65 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1933) ("The proper test is ... whether it is entered into
and carried on in good faith and for the purpose of making a profit.").
41. 21 T.C.M. (P-H) 723 (1952) (citation omitted).
42. 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 1425 (1953).
43. Id. at 1427-28.
44. E.g., Walet v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 461 (1958).
45. 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965).
46. See cases cited supra note 4.
47. EXAMMATION TAx SHaETErs HANDBooK, ch. 300, Real Estate Tax Shelters, 370(4) (states
that with the exception of § 163 interest, § 164 taxes, and § 165 losses, all costs of the partnership before the transition point should be capitalized, citing Richmond Television).
48. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir. 1965).
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nor operations had commenced. The facts indicate that the particular nature
of the broadcasting industry mandate the receipt of the license before revenues
are generated. The commencement of broadcasting was merely incidental to

the receipt of the license.
The court's emphasis on the contingent receipt of the license likewise prevents
a broader application of the holding than is warranted. Although the corporation had made a "decision" 9 to enter business, the possibility of a denial
by the FCC precluded a firm commitment, as emphasized in Blitzer." The
preoperations period was referred to as a "doubtful prefatory stage," and
"there was no certainty that [the station] would obtain a license, or that [the
station] would ever go on the air.""1
To the extent the station was pursuing the license acquisition without
assurance of receipt, the "business" nature of the enterprise was similar to
an investigative stage in that a formal decision to enter business was yet to
be reached.5 2 Unfortunately, the court failed to distinguish the type of initial
decision made in Richmond Television" from a firm and unrestricted decision, such as in Blitzer (where the contingency for entry may be no greater
than the year-to-year continuance of an established business). The court stated:
The uniform teaching of these several cases"' is that, even though
a taxpayer has made a firm decision to enter into business and
over a considerable period of time spent money in preparation for
entering that business, he still has not "engaged in carrying on
any trade or business" within the intendment of section 162(a) until

49. Id. at 905.
50. Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
51. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 905, 907 (4th Cir. 1965).
52. In this limited sense, the courts' reliance on Polachek v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 858
(1954) would be arguably correct. Polachek involved expenses incurred while investigating a prospective business. To the extent Richmond Television is taken for a case involving start-up costs,
the court's reliance on Polachek is improper.
53. Cases cited involving similar fact situations as Richmond Television are Petersburg Television Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (P-H) 290 (1961); KWTX Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 952 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 272 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1959); WBIR v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 803 (1959). These cases, from which Richmond Television purports to derive
its authority for this original rule of law, have been criticized as inapplicable for various reasons,
including the factually distinct nature of the preoperations period in the broadcasting business.
See 1 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNsON, FEDERAL INcoME, GFr AND ESTATE TAXATION 310 ("The Fourth
Circuit has adopted the unrealistic rule that carrying on a 'trade or business' requires the performance of the ultimate activities for which it was organized."); Soloman, Tax Treatment of PreOpening Expenses, 46 TAXES 521 (1968); Erbacher, Start-Up Costs: Are They Deductible by a
Corporationfor Federal Income Purposes?, 48 TAXES 488 (1970).
54. Most disturbing is the court's reliance on Cohn v. United States, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9457 (W.D. Tenn. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958). Although
the taxpayers in Cohn were denied deductibility of expenses incurred prior to the commencement
of operations, the denial was based upon the nonrecurring nature of the expenses. The expenses
at issue in Richmond Television were admittedly ordinary and necessary. Nonetheless, subsequent decisions have cited Richmond Television as authority for capitalizing recurring expenses
as preoperational costs.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss2/31

1983]

NOTES

such time as the business has begun to function as a going concern
and performed those activities for which it was organized."
The Richmond Television rationale has evolved into a general rule denying
section 162 deduction for all preoperating costs, regardless of the existence
of a contingent "license" to do business. In Madison Gas & Electric Co. -v.
Commissioner,6the taxpayer formed a partnership with other public utilities
for the construction and operation of a nuclear generating plant and sought
to deduct expenses5 7 incurred both prior to the issuance of an operating license
and prior to the commencement of operations. The taxpayer contended that
the partnership, assuming one existed, had commenced business not upon
receipt of the operating license but upon prior receipt of the provisional construction permit issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The
Tax Court found the contention "contrary to the well-established case law," 58
the situation being factually indistinguishable from Richmond Television,
despite a finding that the NRC Commissioner never denied an operating license
upon completion of a facility under the authority of the provisional construction permit.5 9 Whether the Tax Court found the "trade or business" threshold
was reached upon the receipt of the license or the commencement of operations, or both, the Seventh Circuit seemingly resolved all doubt by affirming
that the expenses were "non-deductible, pre-operational start-up costs of the
partnership venture." 60
The "preoperations" aspect of the Richmond Television rule was applied
in finding the construction of residential housing did not constitute carrying
on of a trade or business until the project was completed and receiving rental
income. 6 A pharmacy, quite capable of filling prescriptions, could not deduct6
preparation expenses until the business had "opened its doors to the public."
The portion of a management fee paid by a limited partner to the partnership
for the supervision of the construction and financing of an oil rig, which is
ruled nondeductible until the rig was
allocable to recurring start-up costs, was
63
completed and placed in operation.
Thus far, Blitzer is the only reported case directly challenging the Rich55. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir. 1965).
56. 72 TC. 521 (1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980).
57. Start-up costs included expenses for the training of employees, the development of internal procedures and guidelines for plant operation, hiring activities, nuclear field management,
environmental activities, and the purchase of spare parts. The Commissioner had conceded that
if the expenses were incurred for the expansion of an existing business and not for a new business
(or partnership), they would be currently deductible under § 162(a).
58. Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 566 (1979).
59. Id. at 539.
60. Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 633 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1980).
61. Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424 (1980); Francis v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M.
(P-H) 706 (1977). Contra, 379 Madison Ave., Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1932).
62. Kennedy v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (P-H) 55 (1973) ("Albeit Mr. Kennedy was legally
capable of filling prescriptions at an earlier date because of having acquired the requisite licenses,
the ability to transact business does not satisfy the 'carrying on' requirement of the statute.").
63. Rev. Rul. 150, 1981-1 C.B. 119.
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mond Television concept of simultaneously matching revenues and expenses.
The impact of Richmond Television has been lessened, though, by the District
Court of Maryland in United States v. Manor Care, Inc.,64 which held certain "preoperating" expenses incurred prior to the receipt of an operating
license to be currently deductible. Although the expenses incurred by the nursing home corporation were also prior to the furnishing of nursing home care
to patients, the court emphasized the taxpayers were generally assured of receiving a nursing home license if certain objective requirements were met due
to the noncompetitive nature of the business.
In distinguishing Richmond Television, the court stated: "While the language
of Richmond is broad, it would be reading too much into the case to conclude that, as a matter of law, no company can deduct expenses indurred
before it obtains a required license." 6 It is not clear whether the court considered the taxpayers to be carrying on a trade or business when the expenses
were incurred since the actual business operations began in the same taxable
year.
Expansion of an Existing Trade or Business
Existing business can escape the restraints placed on newly created business
if the acquisition of the new income-producing entity, or plant, or tract of
land, was an expansion of the existing business." In recognizing the expansion issue is involved both in determining whether a new trade or business
is created and whether a separate
and distinct additional asset is acquired,
7
one can avoid confusion.6
Generally, in cases involving customer services, the creation of a new method
by which to supply that service is distinguished from entering a new business.'1
For example, an established bank that adopts a credit card program to replace
the letter of credit and other traditional loan devices has simply created a
new method to conduct an old business.' 9 For the same reason, a change of
method in making sales or the development of a new sales territory does not
create a new business.7 However, the acquisition of another separate and
distinct business entity or the addition of a new branch or division with the
purpose of producing a different product is clearly the making of a new
64. 490 F. Supp. 355 (D. Md. 1980).
65. Id. at 359.
66. S.REP. No. 1036, supra note 9, provides as follows: "In the case of an existing business,
eligible start-up expenditures do not include deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses
paid or incurred in connection with an expansion of the business. As under present law, these
expenses will continue to be currently deductible."
67. See NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) fot the presence of both
issues.
68. First Sec. Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1979); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558
F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977); Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th
Cir. 1974).
69. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
70. Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
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business. 7' The addition of a branch or division or the acquisition of a separate
income-producing property-identical in nature to the existing business-may
or may not qualify as an expansion depending on the extent of the existing
operations.
In NCNB Corp. v. United States," the development of branch banks was
considered an established part of the parent bank's operations. The parent
bank in a three-year period opened 57 new branches as part of its statewide banking system. Although the branch bank had no market value apart from the overall
branch banking network of the parent bank, this fact is relevant only as to
whether a separate and distinct additional asset was created. Therefore, the
acquisition of transferable income-producing property, such as rental property
purchased by a real estate development company, should likewise be classified
as an expansion if part of the normal activity of the existing business. An
individual may encounter greater difficulty in establishing the requisite business
activity. The leasing of several properties in a different state for both residential and farming purposes is not a basis for deducting preparatory expenses
incurred for a newly acquired rental house. The existing rental activity of
the taxpayer was not at "such a level and scope" that the newly acquired
property "could fairly come under the umbrella" of the other properties."'
Similarly, in Francisv. Commissioner,74 the court considered the strength
of the taxpayer's existing business activity in determining whether the acquisition of an additional rental property is an expansion: "We cannot consider
the activities surrounding the construction and development of the Doral proor extension of an unrelated
ject [the additional property] to be an integral part
75
and geographically removed rental property."
The acquisition, or creation, of a separate and distinct business entity is
considered a new business if the entity is more than a mere extension of the
existing business. In Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner,76 the parent
corporation, involved in interstate bus transportation, formed a subsidiary
in California to do business there under California law. The business of the
subsidiary involved both interstate and intrastate bus transportation. In holding
that one taxpayer cannot deduct expenses incurred for the benefit of another
taxpayer, the distinctive nature of the two entities compelled a denial of the
parent corporation's claimed deduction. "This is not the case of a mere branch
or division of a business 77conducted solely for convenience' sake under a
separate corporate form."
71. Id.
72. 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982). This decision was a rehearing en banc reversing an earlier

panel decision, NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 86-89.
73. Odom v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 82,531 (1982). See also O'Donnell v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 781 (1974) (umbrella theory of expansion used to disallow deduction for investigatory expenses).
74. 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 706 (1977).
75. Id. at 709.
76. 319 U.S. 590 (1943).
77. Id. at 593.
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When the activity of the separate entity is identical to that of the existing
business, Interstate infers substance is superior to form. In Baltimore Aircoil
Co. v. United States,"8 a Maryland corporation formed a wholly owned subsidiary to operate a plant in California to adequately meet competition. The
United States, conceding that expenses incurred by the parent corporation
would be deductible if the parent had opened a plant in California instead
of establishing a subsidiary corporation, argued that the two entities were
separate and distinct, each engaged in separate, though similar, trades or
businesses. The court, comparing the result in Interstate, held that the subsidiary was a "mere branch or division" and that the separate corporate identities should be disregarded.
On the other hand, Madison Gas & Electric declined to ignore the legal
form of the newly acquired entity in holding expenses of the existing business
were preoperational costs of the partnership. 9 In failing to mention the Interstate rationale, the court stated that "[b]ecause they were each already in the
business of selling electricity, it can, of course, be argued that the partnership
venture itself is an extension of their existing businesses. It does not follow
from this though that we should ignore the partnership as lacking economic
substance." 80
Once it is determined that the costs are incurred for expansion, the inquiry
becomes whether the expenses are "ordinary and necessary" under section
162. The "carrying on any trade or business" hurdle of section 162 has been
cleared and the taxpayer need not be concerned with the elective provisions
of section 195.
Capitalization or Current Expenditure
For the taxpayer who is investigating the prospects of a new business and
is not readily analogous to Blitzer, or who is incurring expenses for planning
and promotion purposes, the benefits of which extend beyond one year, section 195 may well provide relief. Start-up expenditures, as defined in section
195, will only be allowed amortization if those costs would be currently deductible if incurred by an existing trade or business. This requirement necessitates
an examination of the varying tax treatment of these costs, particularly investigatory and nonrecurring start-up costs, afforded to existing businesses.
Although the trade or business requirement is met, the expenses are subject
to restriction by section 263,8" the limitations of which are inherent in the
ordinary and necessary requirement: "The principal function of the term 'ordinary' in § 162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often difficult, between those
78. 333 F. Supp. 705 (D. Md. 1971). Cf. Bennett Paper Corp. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.
458 (1982) (The subsidiary, although expanding the business of the parent, was created primarily
to avoid the demands of the parent's creditors and was recognized as a separate corporate entity
within the general rule of Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943)).
79. Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521 (1979), aff'd 633 F.2d 512,
517 (7th Cir. 1980). Accord, Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424 (1980).
80. 633 F.2d at 517.
81. I.R.C. § 263.
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expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the nature of capital
expenditures, which if deductible at all, must be amortized over the life of
the asset."18 2 But the tests for classifying an outlay in the proper category
have been described to be in a state of "hopeless confusion. '" 3
The conflict can essentially be separated into two separate views founded
on either a balance sheet or income statement line of reasoning." Those emphasizing assets would define a capital expenditure in its ordinary sense, i.e.,
one relating to an item of ownership of a permanent or fixed nature converti-

ble into cash."' The other view emphasizes the need for clear reflection of
income, focusing solely on whether the outlay produces benefits beyond the
accounting period, regardless of the creation of a separate and distinct additional asset.8 6
NCNB Corp. v. United States,87 an en banc decision of the Fourth Circuit,
exemplifies the tenuous status of the tax treatment of start-up costs incurred
in the expansion of an existing business. The taxpayer, a national bank involved
in the development of a branch banking system, desired to deduct in the taxable
year in dispute the costs of market and feasibility studies made in planning
potential branches, internal staff time in implementing the expansion projects,
and applications to the Comptroller of the Currency. The panel decision, agree-

ing with the Commissioner, required capitalization of all costs incurred because
of their relation to the production of future income despite there being no

identifiable intangible asset produced. The en banc majority reversed, concluding the length of the ensuing benefit is not the major factor in determin-

ing a capital expenditure, thus discarding the accounting policy of matching
revenues and costs in the appropriate taxable period.

8

The controlling factor

is whether the expenditures create or enhance separate and identifiable assets;
otherwise, they are considered "ordinary and necessary" expenses under section 162(a).

Under the en banc decision, it is improper to view for capitalization purposes each individual expense, in and of itself, for the length of its ensuing
82. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687-90 (1966)..
83. Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 1973).
84. The panel decision in NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 954 (4th Cir. 1981)
discusses rectnt accounting policy as a premise for rejecting the relevance of the creation or
enhancement of an asset for tax purposes:
Many decades ago, when accounting was still primarily on a cash basis, the most
important financial statement was the balance sheet, which was used by potential
investors in, or creditors of, an enterprise in part to estimate the proceeds which
would be available in case of a forced liquidation ....

Because present-day in-

vestors and creditors, however, tend to focus more on an enterprise's earning power
than on its liquidation value, the income statement has supplanted the balance sheet
as the most important of an entity's financial statements.
85. See Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 786 (2d Cir. 1973).
86. See NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981).
87. NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982).
88. Cf. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Accounting Principles Board
Statement No. 4: Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements
of Business Enterprises (1970).
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benefit, without considering whether a resulting asset was produced. The costs
incurred resulted in the "right" to operate a branch bank in a particular location, but this "right" possessed no objective criteria normally associated with
an asset. The en banc court stated:
The money spent or obligated for metro studies, feasibility studies,
and application to the Comptroller of the Currency, it seems to
us, adds nothing to the value of a bank's assets which can be so
definitely ascertained that it must be capitalized. Certainly no
"separate and distinct additional asset" is created. While the benefit
of all of those classes of expenses may or may not endure for more
than one year, that is but one factor to be considered. The branch
has no existence separate and apart from the parent bank; as a
branch bank, it is not readily salable and has no market value other
than the real estate which it occupies and the tangible equipment
therein.8 9
The majority in NCNB relied on language found in Commissioner v. Lincoin Savings & Loan Ass'n.9' In Lincoln the Supreme Court decided the payment by a savings institution to a reserve fund held by a federal agency was
capital, stating:
Further, the presence of an ensuring benefit that may have some
future aspect is not controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable year. What is important and controlling, we feel is that the . . . payment serves
to create or enhance for Lincoln what is essentially a separate and
distinct additional asset and that, as an inevitable consequence,
the payment is capital in nature and not an expense, let alone an
ordinary expense deductible under § 162(a) ....
1,
Lincoln has been interpreted as having "brought about a radical shift in
emphasis," 92 with new emphasis now upon the identification of a newly created
asset, contrary to the frequently applied future benefits rule. 93 On the other
hand, the Lincoln rule has been deemed an alternative test that need not be
applied in every case. 94 Another position interprets Lincoln as restating the
89. 684 F.2d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 1982).
90. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).

91. Id. at 354 (the Court defined the fund as a "distinct and recognized property interest"
which is both transferable and income-producing and also of a permanent nature because of
restrictions placed upon its sale).

92. See Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. United States, 475 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1973).
93. E.g., United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744 (10th Cir. 1957) ("[A]n expenditure should

be treated as one in the nature of a capital outlay if it brings about the acquisition of an asset
having a period of useful life in excess of one year, or if it secures a like advantage to the

taxpayer which has a life of more than one year.").
94. NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 957-58 (4th Cir. 1981). In other words,
the Service would rely on the pertinence of the "like advantage" phrase as used in United States

v. Akin. See supra note 93.
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well-defined rules, the one-year rule9 being an inherent requirement of the more
determinative separate asset test. 5
Perhaps the strict position taken in the NCNB panel decision, which referred
to separate asset identification as "verbalisms, talismans, and rules of
thumb,"19 6 is unwarranted. The court believed the controlling factor was the
accounting period in which the associated revenues were to be recognized and
not the nature of the benefit which helped produce those revenues. Conservative financial accounting policy should be distinct from the policy of taxing
net income. "The primary goal of financial accounting is to provide useful
information to management, shareholders, creditors and others properly inThe primary goal of the income tax system, in contrast, is the
terested ....
equitable collection of revenue." 97 Granted, courts have used language defining a capital expenditure as simply a cost having utility beyond the taxable
year; 9" but these cases also involved intangible costs as annexed to tangible
assets as well as intangible costs, which by themselves became identifiable
intangible assets with ascertainable value. 9' There still exist no clear guidelines
when the contributing expense is intangible and relates to an intangible asset
95. Jack's Cookie Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 395, 405 (4th Cir. 1979); Florida Publ.
Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 269, 282 (1975). In fact, the Regulations provide that expenditures that result in the creation of an asset having a useful life that extends substantially beyond
the taxable year are not deductible. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) & (2). The Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968) rejected a strict application of the one-year
rule: "We think, however, that it was intended to serve as a mere guidepost for the resolution
of the ultimate issue, not as an absolute rule requiring the automatic capitalization of every
expenditure providing the taxpayer with a benefit enduring for a period in excess of one year."
96. NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 953 (4th Cir. 1981).
97. Thor Power Tool v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
98. Georator Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
945 (1974) involved legal fees for resisting cancellation of a trademark and in holding that the
legal fees constituted capital expenditures, the court noted the test for whether items should be
treated as current expenses or capital expenditure is whether the utility of the expenditure survives the accounting period. The district court in First Nat'l Bank of South Carolina v. United
States, 413 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (D.S.C. 1976) held Georatorto be consistent with the Lincoln
Savings & Loan requirement of an identifiable asset to which expenditures can be related since
the court in Georator "assumed the existence of a trademark." For other cases implying future
benefit rules,.but nevertheless involving ascertainable assets, see American Dispenser Co. v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1968) (outlay for covenant not to compete); Medco Products
Co. v. Commissioner, 532 F.2d 137 "(10th Cir. 1975) (legal expenses in asserting trademark);
Sears Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1966) (bonus for early delivery considered
part purchase price for barge); Stevens v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1968) (cost
of maintaining horses considered part purchase price of horse). But see Wells-Lee v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1966) (physician paid fee to secure hospital facilities and court
held right to practice is an intangible benefit or advantage like a capital asset which must be
amortized over life of hospital. The holidng appears, however, to be based on the similarity
to an asset, and not the future benefits alone).
99. An example of intangible costs incurred to produce an intangible asset would be a salesman
devoting time to a new sales method. Intangible costs that produce or enhance tangible assets
are wages for the construction of a building or legal fees for the defense of a trademark. Intangible costs which by themselves become intangible assets would be the costs incurred for developing a patent.
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of undefined value.100 The test proposed in the panel decision in NCNB would
examine each intangible expense separately (i.e., market studies, feasibility
studies) for their long-term benefits. The en banc's "all or nothing,"'' or
aggregating approach would deny capitalization of all contributing costs
because of the unascertainable value of the associated intangible asset, i.e.,
the "right" to operate a branch bank.
Planning and promotion expenses, such as those incurred in NCNB and
Briarcliff,are more easily justified as capital expenditures when incurred by
a new business. Of course, under the Richmond Television rationale, the
capitalization issue of whether a separate and distinct additional asset must
be created would not be reached until the trade or business requirement was
initially met. Nonetheless, the purchase of a new business is the acquired capital
asset' 2 to which related expenses can be attributed. That the taxpayer develops
the new business through his own efforts does not change the character of
the expenditure incurred in acquiring the asset. 3 However, if an established
business is expanding, the search for an identifiable asset can be quite difficult. The expanding business is essentially developing additional goodwill
when costs are incurred to gain new customers'0 4 or to provide more adequate service for existing customers."" Although the cost of purchased goodwill and other intangibles in the acquisition of an existing business are capital
expenditures,' 0 6 costs of developing intangibles, including goodwill, are deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses of doing business. 07
If goodwill in the sense of "assurance of a market" or "new channels of distribution" is to be regarded as an "asset" as that term
was used in Lincoln Savings and Loan, the search for an asset in
100. Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. United States, 475 F.2d 775, 783 (2d Cir. 1973) (taxpayer incurred
costs, such as sales calls and advertisements, in an effort to expand its sales territory).
101. NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 294 (4th Cir. 1981) (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting).
102. Vermont Transit Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1955).
103. Francis v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. 706 (P-H) (1977).
104. Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. United States, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973). Contra, Houston
Natural Gas v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814, 817 (4th Cir. 1937) ("an intensive campaign at any
time gives rise to capital expenditures").
105. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. United States, 299 F.2d 259 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (costs
of converting customer's appliances for use with different grade of gas were made to retain
customer goodwill and thus deductible).
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(h).
107. Note, Amortization of Intangibles:An Examination of the Tax Treatment of Purchased
Goodwill, 81 HAgv. L. Rnv. 859 (1968). See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933)
(to the extent the issue in Welch is considered to be one between capitalization and current deductibility, the capitalization is justified on the fact the expenses for extinguishing debt to preserve
credit and protect reputation were made in connection with the establishment of a new enterprise); Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 904 (4th Cir. 1965) (the government conceded that expenses for training a staff of broadcasting employees would be deductible
under § 162 if incurred while carrying on a trade or business). See also Dunn & McCarthy v.
Commissioner, 139 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1943); Carl Reimers Co. v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 66
(2d Cir. 1954).
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capitalization cases will become merely a test for the Commissioner's ingenuity in putting names to whatever benefits a taxpayer's
activities have created.' 0 8
The rationale frequently used for exempting certain intangible benefits or
rights from capitalization is their lack of market value, 09 as opposed to the
objective value placed on contract rights or licenses. Distinguishing intangible
benefits by their objective value and transferability is a fair approach. If
capitalization is required for benefits such as the right to own a branch bank
in a particular location, amortization or depreciation possibly will be denied
because of the indefinite life of the asset." ' In that case, the business would
never recover the underlying investment because the "right" could not be
added to the cost of the branch bank, the branch not being a separate trade
or business; rather, the right would simply collect dust as a useless asset on
the taxpayer's books. Even the cost of purchased goodwill can be recovered
in the form of a higher basis upon sale of the business. To be sure, an expanding business will have an intrinsic increase in value as a result of the intangible benefits. But the expanding business is likely to pay for many types of
services that will provide benefits over future periods, but are nevertheless
currently deductible."' As noted in Colorado Springs, "[i]f an expenditure,
concededly of temporal value may neither be expensed or capitalized, the adoption of technological advances is discouraged."" '
The rule in the NCNB majority decision, which focuses on the creation
or enhancement of a separate and distinct additional asset, is beneficial to
108. Gunn, The Requirement that CapitalExpenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C.L.
REv. 443, 489 (1974).
109. The Tenth Circuit in Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1192
(10th Cir. 1974), in assessing the nature of expenses incurred for a credit card system, said:
"The start-up expenditures here challenged did not create a property interest. They produced
nothing corporeal or salable. They are recurring. At the most they introduce a more efficient
method of conducting an old business." Id.
110. See supra note 7.
111. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(a)(2) (allows for deductibility of "good will" advertising "provided the expenditures are related to the patronage the taxpayer might reasonably expect in the
future.") See also Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (expenses
for engineering analysis of extent of oil and gas reserves held deductible since no underlying
tangible or intangible asset to which the survey costs may be added); Goodwyn Crockery Co.
v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 355, aff'd, 315 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1963) (cost of management survey
held deductible although related to future year's business activities). Judge Tannenwald (concurring), in Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 381-82 (1970), discussed the concept of a capital
expenditure in holding a fee expended by a corporate executive to secure employment was deductible under § 162:
That concept has generally been confined to cases of acquisition of tangible assets
or intangible assets, such as a license or goodwill of a going business, or preparation for engaging in a new field of endeavor .... By way of contrast, current
deductibility has normally been permitted for advertising expenditures and for educational expenditures to improve one's skills utilized in existing employment, even
though there were indications that some general benefit would in all probability
last beyond the year of expenditure.
112. Colorado Savings Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 1974).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

the taxpayer who elects amortization under section 195. Start-up expenditures
that provide benefits beyond one year, similar to those incurred by the parent
bank in NCNB, but which result in the acquisition or formation of a new
business, could arguably be capitalized even in the absence of the Richmond
Television rationale." 3 Under section 195, the granting of amortization depends
only on whether the cost would be currently deductible by an existing business.
The taxpayer may spread these deductions over five years, as opposed to their
being recoverable upon disposition of the business in the form of goodwill.
Conclusion
Conceivably, the true purpose of section 195, in regard to ordinary and
necessary start-up costs, is to grant an election between deferral through amortization and current deductibility. Unless there is more positive justification than the
Richmond rule for classifying start-up costs as capital until matched by operational revenue, construing section 195 as relief from the burdens of capitalization does not necessarily satisfy the inquisitive taxpayer. Indeed, investigatory
expenditures incurred in the review of a prospective business are distinguishable
and the effect of section 195 is extremely welcome in this area. Tax parity
is denied, however, if section 195 removes from the realm of section 162
legitimate recurring start-up costs that are incurred for well-intentioned business
purposes.
If the effect of section 195 is to deny a deduction for bona fide business
expenses incurred by a newly formed business prior to operations solely because
the expenses are the groundwork for future revenues, existing businesses will
receive more favorable tax treatment. As the recent trend indicates, the courts
are more inclined to disregard an accounting philosophy of matching expenses
and revenues ifsearch for an identifiable asset with which to justify capitalization. This rule of construction would in fact be beneficial to the new business
subject to section 195 in that certain planning expenses can more easily be
considered as deductible items if incurred by the expanding trade or business.
However, the disregard for the matching concept is fundamentally at odds
with the strict Richmond Television rationale for new businesses. One solution for achieving a balance in tax fairness is to perceive the recurring startup cost in its generally understood sense, i.e., a deductible "business" expense, just as the expansion expenditures are classified according to their
"capital" nature.
Gary B. Wilcox

113. See supra text accompanying notes 101-102.
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